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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
 Luis Javier Mendoza-Ordonez, a citizen of the 
Republic of Honduras, crossed the United States border 
without inspection on two occasions.  After his first entry 
Customs and Border Patrol officers (CBP) detained him and 
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the Government returned him to Honduras under an expedited 
removal.  When CBP detained him after his second entry 
Mendoza requested asylum and, alternatively, asked the 
Government to withhold his removal from the United States 
because he feared for his life if returned to Honduras.1  He 
was placed into a “withholding only” proceeding and after a 
hearing the Immigration Judge denied his requests and 
ordered his removal.  He appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) asserting, primarily, that the 
Immigration Judge ignored key evidence. 
 
 Mendoza now petitions us to review the BIA’s order 
that dismissed his appeal.  He contends that substantial 
evidence supporting his request for withholding of removal 
compels a conclusion that is contrary to that of the BIA.  He 
also maintains that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard 
when it reviewed this claim.  Finally he argues he is eligible 
for asylum.  We will reverse the decision of the BIA and 
grant Mendoza’s petition for withholding of removal.  We 
will deny the petition as to his request for asylum. 
 
II. 
A. 
                                              
1 Mendoza requested withholding of removal under both the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 
§1231(b)(3)(A), and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
8 C.F.R .§ 208.18.  Of these, his petition for review raises 
only the denial of his request for withholding of removal 
under the INA.   
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 Mendoza was born in Honduras in 1989, the son of 
Edith Dalila Mendoza Ordonez and Manuel Ulises Martinez 
Gonzalez.2  Mendoza’s father (Martinez) was politically 
active in the Liberal Party.  He routinely spoke out against the 
National Party and its elected officials in the Honduran 
government.  After unsuccessfully running for mayor of 
Apacilagua, Martinez won an election to serve as a council 
member for the municipality.  He remained a vocal opponent 
of the National Party, accusing it of corruption.   
 
 Tragically, on January 1, 2000, a National Party 
activist named Gerardo Valladares assassinated Martinez and 
wounded Martinez’s wife.  Valladares was convicted of 
murder, imprisoned and released.3  In 2002, Mendoza’s uncle 
(Jose Avilio Martinez Gonzalez) also ran for mayor as a 
Liberal Party candidate; he, too, was assassinated.  The man 
who killed him, Dimas Amador, was—like Valladares—a 
National Party activist.4  Amador was convicted of this crime. 
 
                                              
2 The petitioner refers to his father as Manuel Luis Martinez-
Gonzales.  Martinez was married to another woman, named 
Bessy Magdalena Sanchez Rodriguez, when Mendoza was 
born.  A birth certificate and Sanchez’s testimony on the 
telephone established that Martinez was Mendoza’s father. 
3 Sanchez testified that Valladares received only a six-month 
prison sentence.  The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge 
that this was insufficient evidence to substantiate the length of 
his prison term. 
4 Mendoza did not mention his uncle’s assassination when he 
crossed the United States border from Mexico in either 2014 
or 2015.  Nonetheless, the Immigration Judge found his 
testimony on this event credible. 
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 Throughout his childhood Mendoza attended Party 
functions with his father.  In spite of the murders of his father 
and uncle, Mendoza’s interest in politics persisted.  He served 
as president of the local Liberal Party’s youth division, gave 
speeches supporting the Party between 2008 and 2014, and 
worked for the Party during the national election in 2013.5 
 
 On September 7, 2014, Hector Giron approached 
Mendoza on behalf of Valladares (the assassin of Mendoza’s 
father) and threatened him with the same fate as his father if 
he did not stop speaking out against the National Party.  
Mendoza reported this incident on the following day to Judge 
Miriam Umanzor Aguilar, who told him that she would 
investigate.  Mendoza noted that Umanzor is a National Party 
member and the niece of the Apacilagua mayor (the same 
woman who defeated his father in the mayoral election).  So 
when Mendoza heard nothing from Judge Umanzor in the two 
weeks following the filing of his complaint, he was convinced 
that the Judge would not take action.  He left Apacilagua and 
stayed with one of his sisters in Tegucigalpa.  
  
 In October 2014, he applied for—but was denied—a 
visa to the United States.  Nonetheless, Mendoza crossed the 
United States border from Mexico without inspection on 
November 27, 2014.  CBP agents detained and interviewed 
him on his reasons for crossing.6  On December 3, 2014, the 
                                              
5 Mendoza’s friend (Oman Reuben Ouela Rodriguez)  
testified that Mendoza was politically active. 
 
6 Aspects of this interview are disputed by Mendoza, but 
given his admission that he is not eligible for asylum (see 
infra note 11) and the unchallenged conclusion that 
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Department of Homeland Security executed an expedited 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and returned him to 
Honduras. 
 
 Again, Mendoza lived with a sister in Tegucigalpa.  He 
remained hidden there for four months, still fearing for his 
safety.  On April 17, 2015, Mendoza traveled to Apacilagua 
to visit his ailing grandfather.  The next day Valladares and 
other National Party members approached him.  Valladares 
put a gun to Mendoza’s head and told him that he would kill 
him if he continued to speak out against the National Party.7  
On April 20, 2015, Mendoza filed a complaint with Judge 
Umanzor about this new threat.  When, on April 22, 2015, 
Mendoza heard nothing from the Judge about his complaint, 
he returned to his sister’s house in Tegucigalpa and went back 
into hiding.  He testified that he feared even walking the 
streets. 
 
 Mendoza attempted to re-enter the United States again 
in May 2015, but Mexican authorities detained and returned 
him to Honduras.  He went back to his sister’s house and 
remained in hiding until June 5, 2015.  He then embarked on 
his last attempt to cross the United States border from 
Mexico.  He re-entered the United States in July 2015.  CBP 
detained him approximately six days after he crossed. 
 
                                                                                                     
Mendoza’s claims of politically motivated death threats are 
credible, these issues are not relevant to our deliberation. 
7 Rodriguez and Sanchez witnessed this and testified about it.  
Rodriguez also validated that the threat was grounded in 
Mendoza’s actions on behalf of the Liberal Party.   
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 The Department of Homeland Security determined that 
Mendoza was subject to removal and served him with a 
Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate the Prior Removal 
Order on July 28, 2015.  On September 1, 2015, an asylum 
officer interviewed him to determine if he had credible fear of 
persecution in Honduras.  It was determined that Mendoza’s 
claims warranted further review, and he was referred to the 
Immigration Court for a “withholding only” proceeding. 
 
B. 
 The Immigration Judge concluded that, although 
Mendoza’s testimony credibly established that he received 
death threats for his political opinions, he still did not meet 
his burden of proof for withholding of removal because he 
failed to prove that the Honduran government was unwilling 
or unable to protect him from those threats.  The Immigration 
Judge decided alternatively that the government had proven 
that the periods of time in which Mendoza lived with his 
sisters proved that he could safely relocate in Honduras.  The 
order pretermitted his claim for withholding of removal under 
the INA,8 and his asylum claim.9  It also denied his 
                                              
8 The Immigration Judge did not deny, but instead 
pretermitted (invalidated), Mendoza’s claim for withholding 
of removal under the INA.  The BIA ruled that this was error, 
but it determined that the error was harmless given that the 
Immigration Judge reviewed the merits of Mendoza’s claim 
for withholding of removal.  However, the BIA did not 
explain its decision.  Because we will grant Mendoza’s 
petition for review on his withholding of removal claim 
arising from the INA, we clarify that, as we recently held, 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.31 does not bar withholding of removal for 
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withholding of removal claim under the Convention Against 
Torture.10  
 
 Mendoza filed a timely direct appeal, claiming that the 
Immigration Judge erred by:  deciding that he was ineligible 
for withholding of removal; concluding that he failed to prove 
the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect 
him; ruling that he could safely relocate in Honduras; 
deciding that he should be placed in a “withholding only” 
proceeding; and finally, declaring that he was ineligible for 
asylum.  The BIA dismissed his appeal.  Mendoza filed this 
petition for review. 
 
III. 
A.  
 Mendoza sought our review of the BIA’s dismissal of 
his asylum claim.  But he now concedes that our recent 
decision controls the analysis and forecloses his request for 
asylum.  See Cazun v. Attorney General of the United States, 
                                                                                                     
aliens who are under a reinstated removal order.  Cazun v. 
Attorney General of the United States, 856 F.3d 249, 264 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
9 Upon his second entry into the United States without 
inspection, the Government reinstated his prior removal 
order.  The Immigration Judge explained in her opinion that 
this rendered Mendoza ineligible for asylum.  8 C.F.R. § 
1208.31.  We discuss this in more detail later (see infra note 
11). 
10 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. 
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856 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2017).11  The remaining action 
that Mendoza requests from the government arises from the 
INA, which says:  “[T]he Attorney General may not remove 
an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the 
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(A).  An alien who applies for withholding of 
removal must prove that ‘“it is more likely than not that [his] 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of . . . 
political opinion.’”  Ordonez–Tevalan v. Attorney General of 
the United States, 837 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2016)( quoting 
Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2003)); 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1).12  Mendoza contends that the BIA 
erred by ruling that he failed to prove this. 
                                              
11 At oral argument, Mendoza conceded that our recent 
decision controls the outcome on his asylum claim (Cazun, 
856 F.3d 249), and tacitly recognized the propriety of the 
decision to adjudicate his case in a “withholding only” 
proceeding.  Mendoza argued, as did the petitioner in Cazun, 
that, in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), the BIA unreasonably 
interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) as barring asylum relief to 
those under a reinstatement of a removal order.  However, we 
ruled that “[i]t was reasonable for the agency to conclude that 
the statutory reinstatement bar foreclosing ‘any relief under 
this chapter’ means just what it says: no asylum relief is 
available to those subject to reinstated removal orders.”  
Cazun, 856 F.3d at 260.  Our holding in Cazun controls the 
issue raised by Mendoza, and for this reason, we will deny his 
petition for review on this claim. 
12 Mendoza did not challenge the BIA’s decision denying his 
claim for withholding of removal under the Convention 
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 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  When, as in this instance, 
the BIA provides its own reasoned decision (rather than 
merely adopting the immigration judge’s opinion) we review 
the BIA’s decision as the final decision.  Nelson v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 685 F.3d 318, 321 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Nonetheless, “to the extent the BIA deferred to or 
adopted the [immigration judge’s] reasoning” on particular 
issues, we may consider both opinions on those points.  Id.  
We are empowered to review the BIA’s legal conclusions 
under a de novo standard of review.  Borges v. Gonzales, 402 
F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir.2005).  But we must regard all 
determinations about facts grounding the final order as 
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B).  Factual findings include statements about the 
events and circumstances in the country grounding an alien’s 
claim that he or she suffered persecution.  Kaplun v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 602 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir.  
2010).13 
 
 Mendoza alleges the BIA made two errors.  First, he 
contends the entire record compels a result contrary to BIA’s 
finding that he failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
support his request for withholding of removal.  He also 
                                                                                                     
Against Torture, nor did he object to the BIA’s denial of his 
withholding of removal claim under the INA that was based 
on his membership in a social group. 
13 The determination of whether the events and circumstances 
alleged rise to the level of persecution is a legal determination 
that the BIA decides de novo.  Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 270. 
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claims that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review 
when it analyzed his argument that the Immigration Judge 
ignored key evidence.  We will address this latter issue first. 
 
B. 
 The BIA is required to examine challenges to the 
immigration judge’s factual findings for clear error.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i).  Clear error is commonly defined as “an 
obvious, plain, gross, significant, or manifest error or 
miscalculation.”  Concrete Pipe and Products of California, 
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern 
California, 508 U.S. 602, 653 (1993). 
 
 In his petition for review Mendoza says that the BIA 
failed to use the clear error standard when it reviewed his 
appeal.  The Government agrees that clear error review 
applies, and points out that the BIA correctly referred to it 
early in its opinion.  This is true, but later in its discussion of 
the country reports, the BIA also said: 
[Mendoza] did not establish that 
this evidence is sufficient to 
impact the outcome of the case. . . 
. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N 
Dec. 464 (BIA 1992)( holding 
that an alien seeking to reopen or 
remand proceedings bears a heavy 
burden of proving that the new 
evidence offered would likely 
change the result of the alien’s 
case). 
 
12 
 
The BIA’s error is readily apparent.  It should have been 
examining, in the context of a direct appeal:  whether the 
Immigration Judge failed to review and weigh the country 
reports that were in the record; and, if she did ignore the 
reports, whether this error undermined her factual finding 
about the Honduran government’s willingness and ability to 
protect Mendoza from death threats.  Instead, mistakenly 
applying the standard for a motion to remand or reopen, the 
BIA deliberated on:  whether these reports were significant 
enough to warrant consideration as new evidence (as though 
they were not already part of the record); and whether the 
reports provided a sufficient basis to reopen the case.14 
 
 Yet, even though we are confident the BIA made a 
mistake, we are less certain about the impact it had on its 
decision.  Because the BIA’s discussion of the reports is so 
brief, we do not know exactly how it analyzed them.  It is also 
impossible to gauge whether its treatment of the reports as 
new evidence prejudiced its assessment of them in any way.  
For these reasons we cannot assess the precise impact that the 
BIA’s error had on its conclusion.  Nonetheless, we do not 
need to pursue this issue further because, when the entire 
record is considered, we are certain Mendoza’s substantial 
evidence claim has merit. 
 
C. 
                                              
14 Matter of Coelho addresses a motion to remand that sought 
the consideration of new evidence.  It followed its practice of 
regarding the motion as if it was a motion to reopen.  Matter 
of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 471. 
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 Our review for substantial evidence does not merely 
rest on our discovery of alternative theories or findings that 
could be supported by the record.  Rather, it requires that we 
examine the entire record to decide whether this body of 
evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to make a 
determination contrary to that made by the BIA.  He Chun 
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).15  
  
 We begin by noting that the BIA accepted the 
Immigration Judge’s credibility determinations on key facts 
in Mendoza’s petition.  The BIA did not disturb the 
Immigration Judge’s conclusion that Mendoza received two 
death threats in 2014 and 2015.  It accepts that these threats 
originated with the same man who killed his father in 2000.  
The BIA did not express any problems with the notion that 
the threats were due to Mendoza’s political activity.  And it 
agrees that Mendoza made complaints to Honduran 
authorities and that nothing resulted from them.16  But since 
the death threats directed at Mendoza did not come from 
someone within the government, the BIA properly focused on 
whether Mendoza had shown that the Honduran government 
was unwilling or unable to protect him from the threats.  Lie 
v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).  It ultimately 
                                              
15 ‘“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Senathirajah v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d 
Cir. 1998)( quoting Turcios v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Service, 821 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
16The BIA stated that “the Immigration Judge properly ‘found 
that’ nothing resulted from the applicant filing two 
complaints. . . .” 
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ruled that he did not provide enough evidence on this 
essential piece of his case and therefore he did not prove his 
eligibility for withholding of removal. 
 
 To prove his eligibility, Mendoza gave the 
Immigration Judge evidence about the death threats, the 
political affiliation of Valladares and Judge Umanzor, and 
country condition reports from a variety of sources.  But the 
Immigration Judge never acknowledged the reports.  
Moreover, although the BIA made a ruling based on its 
review of the reports, it did not explain what was in them.  
Therefore, we will address what we found in our review that 
was relevant to Mendoza’s petition. 
 
 A 2013 article from Rights Action states that, after the 
National Party came into power in 2009, violence related to 
the electoral process in Honduras steadily rose.  It also saw an 
increase in the number of politically motivated deaths.  It 
commented that violence had been directed at Liberal Party 
members.  A.R. 336.  A 2013 State Department Human 
Rights Report described the 2013 elections as credible but 
concluded that the justice system suffers from “institutional 
weakness,” subjecting it to corruption and intimidation.  It 
referred to a number of instances in which military or police 
officials who were suspected of violating human rights were 
not prosecuted.  A.R. 375.   A 2014 State Department Human 
Rights Report discussed government efforts to combat 
corruption, but it also highlighted significant institutional and 
societal challenges that hampered the success of its efforts.  
A.R. 421.  It noted particular “concern regarding corruption 
in the judiciary and security forces.”  A.R. 420.  A 2015 
Human Rights Watch report said that the system for selecting 
judges in Honduras had many irregularities, and it reasoned 
15 
 
from this that the system generally lacked the protections 
necessary to guard against political interference.  A.R. 326.  
Finally, a Freedom House report from 2015 stated that 
roughly 80% of the crimes occurring in the country are never 
reported, and that police actually investigate only 4% of 
crimes that are reported.  A.R. 332.  All of the reports 
included discussion of widespread corruption and violence in 
Honduras, and described an environment in which civil rights 
protections are eroding. 
 
 Since the BIA did not discuss the substance of these 
reports, we look to other aspects of its opinion to understand 
why, even with this evidence, it ruled that Mendoza did not 
carry his burden of proof.  Three aspects of its decision were 
prominent.   
 
 First, the BIA referenced the convictions of Valladares 
in 2000 and Amidor in 2002 (the men who assassinated 
Mendoza’s father and uncle) ostensibly to show that the 
Honduran government does investigate and prosecute 
politically motivated violence.  The BIA obliquely 
acknowledged that this evidence pre-dated (by over a decade) 
the death threats Mendoza received.  However, it implied that 
Mendoza failed to show that conditions in the country had 
grown worse in that period of time.17 
                                              
17 The BIA did not explicitly state that Mendoza failed to 
prove a change in conditions in Honduras.  Instead, as part of 
its discussion rejecting Mendoza’s assertion that Valladares 
had received a short prison sentence, it said:  “[W]e conclude 
that the applicant did not submit sufficient testimonial or 
documentary evidence to establish that the length of time that 
his alleged persecutor was imprisoned and the passage of 
16 
 
   
 In response to Mendoza’s Petition for Review, the 
Government defended the BIA’s assessment of the 
relationship between the convictions (of Valladares and 
Amidor) and the country reports with a different line of 
reasoning.  It brushed aside the country condition reports as 
nothing more than Mendoza’s misguided attempt to 
“override” evidence of the convictions of Valladares and 
Amidor.  Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“To whatever extent these materials show that there is 
a general problem of gang violence . . . we do not believe 
they can override the evidence in this case that police 
conducted a thorough investigation. . . .”); Matter of 
McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 546 (BIA 1980) (“We do not 
give much weight to those articles submitted by the [alien] 
which are of a general nature and do not in any way relate to 
the [alien] himself.”).  The implication is that, in the face of 
direct evidence of convictions, country condition reports have 
little weight. 
 
 A second aspect of the BIA’s decision we regarded as 
important was its perspective on the fact that Mendoza’s 
assertion of past persecution relies on an inference of political 
corruption that is grounded in the Honduran government’s 
                                                                                                     
time since his imprisonment establishes that the government 
of Honduras is unable or unwilling to protect him.”  In 
context, we understand this to express the BIA’s conclusion 
that Mendoza failed to prove that the political and legal 
environment in Honduras (which, it implies, enabled the 
conviction of his father’s assassin) had deteriorated. 
17 
 
inaction on his complaints.18  The BIA dismissed Mendoza’s 
inference as pure speculation by concluding generally that the 
evidence does not support the notion that the Honduran 
government was unwilling or unable to protect him.  It also 
specified that even the “background evidence” (a reference to 
the country condition reports) does not change this outcome.  
The BIA underscored its assessment that evidence supporting 
Mendoza’s inference is weak by proffering, albeit in an off-
hand manner, an alternative inference drawn from the 
Honduran government’s inaction on his complaints that the 
government’s inaction was due to Mendoza’s impatience.19  
 The Government defended the BIA’s reasoning by 
referencing precedent in which we ruled that the Honduran 
government’s failure to act on complaints of threats did not 
necessarily show that it had been unwilling or unable to 
respond to an alien’s complaints of violence and threats by 
                                              
18 The Government asserts that the Immigration Judge made a 
finding that Mendoza failed to prove the Honduran 
government did not act.  In fact, the Immigration Judge 
equivocated, saying she “hesitates to make the same 
assumption [as Mendoza did] that the courts were not going 
to do anything.”  She said nothing further on this.  Our 
analysis is grounded in the BIA’s conclusion that “nothing 
resulted” from Mendoza’s complaints.  
19 It said that “although nothing resulted from the applicant 
filing two complaints against the man who threatened him[,] 
the applicant waited only a short period of time after filing the 
complaints before assuming that nothing would be done about 
the complaints. . . .”  The BIA also said it was Mendoza’s 
impatience—demonstrated by him leaving Apacilagua two 
weeks after the first complaint and two days after the second 
complaint—that prevented any investigation from occurring. 
18 
 
gangs.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the 
United States, 663 F.3d 582, 610 (3d Cir. 2011).  That case, 
which focused on gang violence, relied on 2005 country 
reports that documented the Honduran government’s reform 
efforts, such as new security patrols, and anti-gang 
legislation.  Id.  We concluded that those reports weakened 
the alien’s attempt to use inaction on his complaints as a basis 
to infer the government’s unwillingness or inability to protect 
him.  We noted that, lacking strong supporting evidence, 
numerous reasonable inferences could be made from the 
Honduran government’s inaction that would not support the 
alien’s claims.  Id. 
 
 The third, and final aspect of the decision that was of 
particular interest to us was the BIA’s judgment that it did not 
need to address an alternative decision by the Immigration 
Judge.20  The Immigration Judge decided on alternative 
                                              
20 We may address rulings by the Immigration Judge “to the 
extent the BIA deferred to or adopted the [immigration 
judge’s] reasoning” on a particular issue.  Nelson, 685 F.3d at 
321.  Here the BIA found no need to rule on the Immigration 
Judge’s decision that the Government carried its burden of 
proving that Mendoza could safely relocate.  It did so because 
it agreed with the Immigration Judge’s underlying reasoning 
that the record was insufficient to ground the prerequisite 
finding that the Honduran government was unwilling or 
unable to protect Mendoza.  This obviated the need for a 
determination that Mendoza could safely relocate because the 
BIA’s ruling implicitly determined this.  Our review 
encompassed the entire record that was before the 
Immigration Judge and the BIA.  Moreover, our findings on 
this record (arising from other issues, see infra) 
19 
 
grounds that, even if Mendoza had established past 
persecution, the government nonetheless met its burden of 
proof to show that he could safely relocate to Honduras.  (8 
C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3)(ii)).  The Immigration Judge was 
convinced that, since Mendoza lived with his sisters for a 
period of time after the death threats without any incident, 
this was sufficient evidence to show that safe relocation was 
possible.  She noted, however, that her finding also was 
grounded in her assessment that Mendoza failed to 
substantiate his claim that he was fearful after the death 
threats or that he needed to go into hiding when he was 
staying with his sisters.  The BIA’s ruling that Mendoza did 
not prove the Honduran government’s unwillingness or 
inability to protect him implicitly adopts this reasoning, 
which obviated the need for an explicit ruling that Mendoza 
could safely relocate there. 
 
 Although these three aspects of the decision give us an 
idea of how the BIA viewed Mendoza’s petition, we 
nonetheless are baffled by its assessment that the country 
reports were unimportant to the outcome of the case.  To the 
contrary, we regard the evidence in these reports as a critical 
piece of the record. 
 
 The BIA raised up the convictions of Valladares and 
Amidor as affirmative evidence of a properly functioning 
justice system that contradicts Mendoza’s claims.  Although 
evidence of country conditions around the time of those 
                                                                                                     
fundamentally contradict the Immigration Judge’s reasoning 
and ruling, and they also eliminate any basis for the BIA’s 
implicit ruling that Mendoza can safely relocate.  Therefore, 
we may review the Immigration Judge’s ruling on this issue. 
20 
 
convictions is not in this record, the reports Mendoza 
submitted give us a substantive understanding of conditions 
in Honduras when he received the death threats:  widespread 
human rights abuses; unchecked politically motivated 
violence; and a poorly functioning justice system, vulnerable 
to corruption, that failed to reign in the violence.  As a result, 
we are convinced that convictions occurring more than a 
decade before the death threats have little value in the context 
of the entire record.  The convictions do not contradict or 
even diminish evidence portraying fundamentally different 
country conditions at the time of the threats.21  Therefore, we 
conclude that—in light of this entire record—the BIA’s 
reliance on the convictions of Valladares and Amidor to form 
conclusions about country conditions at the time of the death 
threats was not reasonably grounded in the record and is not 
owed our deference. 
 
 Similarly, the BIA implies that—like Valdiviezo-
Galdamez—the record is too weak to support an inference 
that the justice system is corrupt and biased.  However, 
Mendoza grounded his inference by testifying that Valladares 
and Umanzor belong to the National Party, and by testifying 
that Umanzor is the niece of the woman who was a political 
opponent of Mendoza’s father.  This testimony was not 
challenged.  He then pointed to the country reports.  One 
report noted that only a small fraction of crimes brought to 
the government are ever investigated.  A second report 
discussed a justice system that is systemically vulnerable to 
                                              
21 Unlike Menjivar, these reports were not general in nature, 
but rather provided analysis that gave close support to the 
claims Mendoza made about problems with the Honduran 
justice system.  Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 922. 
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political influence and corruption.  Finally, another report 
documented that the Honduran government failed to 
prosecute officials who were known to have committed 
human rights violations.  This was only a small part of the 
country condition evidence presented that supported his 
claims.  These country reports demonstrate that Mendoza’s 
experience (threats of violence that receive no government 
response or investigation) was by no means an isolated case.  
All of this provides a compelling grounding for his inference 
that the inaction on his complaints was due to the shared 
political affiliations of the perpetrator and the Judge, and a 
justice system that allows and enables such corruption by 
political influence.22 
 Finally, as to the Immigration Judge’s observation, 
implicitly endorsed by the BIA, that Mendoza did not 
legitimate his fear or his need to go into hiding, we regard this 
conclusion as contrary to the record.  As we have already 
stated, after establishing that he faced death threats, Mendoza 
provided evidence of a systemic problem with the justice 
system that was not unique to Apacilagua.  The reports made 
clear that politically motivated violence, virtually 
unrestrained, was a reality that afflicted the entire country.  
                                              
22 As for the BIA’s alternative inference regarding Mendoza’s 
impatience, we generally defer to inferences made by the 
immigration judge or BIA.  But deference is not owed when 
the inference is not reasonably grounded in the record “as a 
whole.”  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 
2003).  In this instance, there is absolutely nothing in the 
record to support the BIA’s theory that impatience explains 
the government’s inaction.  It is, therefore, not entitled to our 
deference. 
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Therefore, in the context of the entire record, Mendoza’s fear 
and his need to go into hiding have been amply and 
compellingly substantiated. 
 
 Throughout this review of the BIA’s decision, we have 
been aware that the deferential “substantial evidence” 
standard of review establishes a high bar for disturbing the 
factual conclusions of the BIA.  Moreover, we know that—
even when we come across evidence in the record that would 
compel a different finding—“the proper course, except in rare 
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 
investigation or explanation.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. 
Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).  This would ordinarily be 
the case particularly where, as here, the BIA’s analysis of key 
evidence is scant.  Nonetheless, there are a few instances in 
which ‘“application of the correct legal principles to the 
record could lead only to the same conclusion’” and in these 
rare cases ‘“there is no need to require agency 
reconsideration.’”  Kang v. Attorney General of the United 
States, 611 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zabala v. 
Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations 
omitted)).  This is such a case. 
 
 In this instance, we are convinced that evidence of the 
politically motivated death threats, the inaction on Mendoza’s 
complaints, a perpetrator and judge who shared a political 
affiliation in opposition to that of Mendoza, and evidence of a 
politically corrupt justice system that failed to reign in 
politically motivated violence in Honduras compels two 
findings:  first, the Honduran government was unwilling or 
unable to protect Mendoza from death threats; and, second, 
Mendoza could not safely relocate in Honduras.  These 
findings, in turn, lead only to one reasonable conclusion: ‘“it 
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is more likely than not that [Mendoza’s] life or freedom 
would be threatened [in Honduras] on account of . . . political 
opinion.’”  Ordonez–Tevalan, 837 F.3d at 341 (quoting 
Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 726); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1).  For this 
reason, we conclude that this case is one of those rare 
instances in which remand is not necessary.  The record 
compels a conclusion that withholding of removal should be 
granted, and we will do so. 
 
IV. 
 For all of these reasons, we will reverse the BIA’s 
decision and grant Luis Mendoza Ordonez’s petition for 
withholding of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(A).  We will deny the petition for review on the 
request for asylum. 
